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clarify the relationship between trusts and the PRA
T
rusts emerge regularly in relationship property dis-
putes and they are generally well understood to take
priority whenever there is a competition between the
trust and a claim that the trust property otherwise falls
within the pool of relationship assets available for division.
Nevertheless, there appears to be some confusion over the
boundaries of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA)
as it applies to trust property and this can cost a spouse,
partner or beneficiary property that is rightfully theirs. This
article explains three important points that ought to be borne
in mind by practitioners working in this area, illustrated by
an analysis of three recent decisions.
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
Trust property cannot be classified as relationship property
unless it is beneficially owned by either of the parties to the
relationship.
The only type of property to which the PRA applies is
property beneficially owned by one or both of the parties.
Section 2 of the PRA defines an “owner” as “the person who,
apart from this Act, is the beneficial owner of the property
under any enactment or rule of common law or equity”. In
other words, where it is alleged that property held on trust
should be considered relationship property, that assertion
must be determined first by reference to the ordinary prin-
ciples of trust law. Only if it is established that at least one of
the parties has a beneficial interest in the trust property is it
necessary then to determine whether that interest qualifies as
relationship property or separate property according to the
classification provisions in ss 8 to 10 of the Act.
So, in relation to the first enquiry, a party who has a vested
interest in a trust will be a beneficial owner of the trust assets.
A contingent interest is also treated as property of the ben-
eficiary, though its value will depend on the nature of the
contingency (Hunt v Muollo [2003] 2 NZLR 322 (CA);
Johns v Johns [2004] 3 NZLR 202 (CA); Kain v Hutton
[2008] 3 NZLR 589 (SC)). A discretionary interest, on the
other hand, is not property of the beneficiary unless and until
the trustees exercise their discretion by making an appoint-
ment in favour of a particular beneficiary. Prior to making
the appointment the potential beneficiaries have at most a
hope or expectation, which is not property (Gartside v
Inland Revenue Commissioner [1968] AC 553; Nation v
Nation [2005] 3 NZLR 46 (CA)). Nor is it capable of
valuation on ordinary valuation principles (S Griffiths, “Valu-
ation of interests in discretionary trusts; Valuing the invalu-
able and unvaluable?” New Zealand Law Society Relationship
Property Intensive — your big day out! (2010) 55 at 63). For
that reason, a party’s discretionary interest in a trust (prior to
any appointment to that party) cannot be property over
which the PRA can reach.
This point was, with respect, missed in SMB v GAC (FC
North Shore FAM-2007-044-946, 19 November 2010; HC
Auckland, CIV-2010-404-8320, 25 July 2011). Mr C and
Ms B had been in a de facto relationship for some 7 years. Ms
B claimed a greater than equal share of the relationship
property on the basis of extraordinary circumstances, The
litigation involved three trusts. Two of these trusts had made
distributions to the parties and these distributions were clearly
relationship property.
The Courts’ reasoning in relation to the third trust, the
C Trust, on the other hand, is problematic. The C Trust held
an interest in a superannuation scheme which increased in
value during the relationship by some $25,000. There was
confusion over the terms of its settlement, which was mate-
rial to Mr C’s interest in the Trust and to Ms B’s relationship
property entitlement. Mr C had acquired an interest in a
superannuation policy called Fidelity Super Cache Plan in
1984. The policy was derived from CFML which sold Fidel-
ity products on commission. Fidelity deducted a portion of
the commissions due to CFML as contributions to the super-
annuation scheme. CFML then paid the remainder of the
commissions to Mr C as earnings. On 20 June 1998, six
months before Mr C began his de facto relationship with
Ms B, Mr C declared in writing that he held his interest in the
superannuation scheme on trust for a family trust still to be
formed for the benefit of himself and his daughter absolutely.
However the terms of the C Trust, which he eventually
settled just after the relationship began, differed from the
original declaration. The trust deed gave the trustees abso-
lute discretion as to income and capital and had a wider class
of beneficiaries.
Both the Family Court and the High Court held that the
increase in value was relationship property, but for different
and, in our view, incorrect reasons. The increase in value was
attributable to the application of relationship property because
the contributions to the scheme were sourced from commis-
sions that would otherwise have been paid as earnings to
Mr C. However, both decisions failed to ask and answer the
prior question discussed above: what property interest, if
any, did Mr C have in the C Trust that could possibly be the
subject of a PRA claim?
The Family Court relied on the Court of Appeal’s obiter
dictum in Walker v Walker [2007] NZCA 30 that a discre-
tionary beneficiary who controlled a trust had a valuable
“package of rights” that was property. As Mr C had the
power to appoint and remove trustees, and the power to vary
and resettle the trust both as to income and capital, he had
total control of the trust, which in combination with his
rights as a discretionary beneficiary amounted to a package
of rights that was property as defined by the Act (at [40]).
Moving on to the second question of classification, the Court
held that because that property right was attributable to the
New Zealand Law Journal December 2011 423
Copyright of the New Zealand Law Journal  is the property of LexisNexis NZ Ltd and its content may not be copied, saved or emailed to multiple sites 
or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's written permission. However, users may print, download or email articles for individual use. 
 
 
relationship, it was relationship property. Ms B was accord-
ingly entitled to share equally in the increase in value of the
Trust’s interest in the superannuation scheme.
This sort of reasoning in other cases has been widely
criticized. Not only does it misconceive the obiter dictum in
Walker v Walker, it also disregards the interests of the other
beneficiaries in the trust, in particular Mr C’s daughter (see
further Peart et al “Trusts and relationship property in New
Zealand” (2011) 17 Trusts and Trustees 866 and J Palmer
“Controlling the Trust” forthcoming [2011] Otago LR).
Even if this package or bundle of rights idea is accepted, it
relates to the party’s interests outside the trust. As the Court
in LR v JR (Bankrupt) FC Auckland FAM-2008-004-
000715, 20 April 2011 appreciated, it does not convert a
discretionary interest into beneficial ownership of the trust
assets (at para [59]). All it accomplishes is to say that Mr C
owned powers of control but not, crucially, that he owned
the superannuation policy to which relationship property
had contributed.
Fortunately, the High Court disagreed with the Family
Court’s application of Walker v Walker but, unfortunately,
held instead that the increase in value was relationship
property because it was funded from the application of
relationship property (at [29]). This presumes that Mr C
beneficially owned the policy without actually asking whether
that was the case. This reasoning would have been correct (at
least as to half of the increase in value) if the original
declaration of trust, rather than the trust deed, had governed
the trust terms. Pursuant to the declaration of trust, Mr C
had a vested interest that therefore rendered him an owner of
half of the policy under the PRA with his daughter owning
the other half. As to the second question of classification,
while the initial capital value would have been his separate
property, the increase in value would have been relationship
property under s 9A(1), because the increase was attributable
to the application of relationship property. However, it seems
that the High Court accepted the Family Court’s decision
that the trust was governed by the trust deed. On that basis,
Mr C merely had a discretionary interest in the C Trust,
which is not property. Any increase in the value of the trust
property was therefore also not property beneficially owned
by Mr C and accordingly not within the PRA’s jurisdiction.
A similar analysis applies to a forestry investment held by
the G Trust discussed at [47]–[49] where the Court awarded
half the value of the investment to Ms B on the basis that the
investment was funded by the application of relationship
property. Once again, this misses the vital point that it was
property held on trust. There is no prior discussion of who
the beneficiaries of the G Trust were and what interests Mr C
had in the trust property.
The errors in analysis resulted in Ms B taking from the
trusts property that could not be relationship property and
thereby depriving beneficiaries of the trusts of their rights to
benefit. It is easy to be distracted by one party’s control of a
trust, but control does not amount to a proprietary interest.
Had the case been analysed properly, Ms B’s claims would
not have been permitted to undermine the trusts. This does
not mean that she was without remedy for the loss of
relationship property. The possibility of a compensation
claim under s 44C PRA is considered below.
TRUST LAW PREVAILS
The extent of beneficial ownership of property subject to a
trust must be determined first and foremost by principles of
trust law.
It is necessary to determine the extent of a party’s benefi-
cial ownership according to trust law before applying the
relevant PRA provisions to classify and divide the parties’
assets. This is particularly important where other beneficia-
ries have an interest in property that would otherwise be
subject to the Act.
This point is well illustrated by L v P (HC Auckland
CIV-201-404-6103, 17 August 2011); on appeal from DP v
UL (FC North Shore, FAM-2007-044-000882, 17 August
2010)). Mr L and Ms P lived together for about 4 years
between 2001 and 2006 (excluding two periods of separa-
tion). Mr L bought a home in January 2002 for $285,000,
funded by a mortgage of $200,000 and the balance from his
separate property. In November 2002 Ms P gave birth to
their daughter, K. Mr L’s sister died in June 2003, leaving the
residue of her estate equally to L and K. In June 2004 Mr L
received $287,744 from his sister’s estate, on behalf of him-
self and K. Instead of investing K’s half share until her
18th birthday, as his sister had intended, he used $248,000 of
the inherited funds to pay off the mortgage and make improve-
ments to the home. It was impossible to ascertain what
happened to the rest of the inheritance, because Mr L’s
evidence was extremely vague. Importantly, the Family Court
found that no part of the inheritance received survived in any
account or investment apart from the family home (at [27]).
The remainder of the inheritance was therefore untraceable.
When Mr L and Ms P separated in 2006, Ms P claimed an
equal share of the family home which had increased in value
to $460,000. The question was to what extent L beneficially
owned the family home, given his apparent misappropria-
tion of K’s inheritance. The Family Court and the High Court
gave different answers to this question, neither of them
correct in our view.
The Family Court held that all of K’s share of the inherit-
ance was used on the home and should be deducted from the
value of the home before dividing the net value equally
between Mr L and Ms P. This meant that not all of Mr L’s
inheritance went into the home and he bore the loss of the
untraceable portion of the inheritance. Ms P appealed argu-
ing that the Family Court had no jurisdiction to determine a
beneficiary’s entitlement pursuant to a trust and was wrong
then to deduct that interest so as to diminish her relationship
property entitlement.
The High Court rejected the jurisdictional point, as indeed
it had to. While issues as between Mr L and K arising from
the use of K’s inheritance would have to be determined by the
High Court under its equitable jurisdiction, the Family Court’s
primary function in the relationship property proceeding
was to ascertain what property Mr L and Ms P beneficially
owned and thus the extent of their daughter’s beneficial
interest in the house. However, the High Court did not agree
with the way the Family Court carried out that function. The
Court accepted that some of the $248,000 was used by Mr L
in apparent breach of trust, but held that for purposes of
assessing the rights as between Mr L and Ms P, any adverse
consequences of Mr L’s breach should be visited fully on him
before any were visited on Ms P. Mr L was therefore treated
as having first used his own share of the inheritance on the
home before he resorted to his daughter’s share. This meant
that all of Mr L’s inheritance and only part of K’s legacy was
attributed to the $248,000 spent on the home. Thus, after
deducting K’s interest in the home, the net value to be divided
between Mr L and Ms P was greater than that declared in the
Family Court.
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With respect, the reasoning in both judgments is wrong,
because neither gives full recognition to K’s rights as a
beneficiary of a fixed trust and the remedies available to her
to enforce those rights. The flaw in the Family Court’s
reasoning is that by deducting the amount of K’s legacy from
the value of the home the Court essentially treated K as a
creditor with nothing more than a personal claim for repay-
ment of a debt. The Court disregarded her right as a benefi-
ciary to trace her funds into the home and elect either to
claim a proportionate share of the home or take a charge
over the home as security for the personal claim she had
against her father for restoration of the trust money. Those
are the remedies available to a beneficiary when trust money
has been misappropriated: Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC
102 at 130–131. By limiting K’s interest to a monetary
amount equivalent to her share of the inheritance, the Court
allowed Mr L to profit from the increase in value. That is a
fundamental breach of trust law.
The High Court ruling also failed to apply the tracing
rules properly. Not only did it limit K to a charge over the
property, thus denying her a proportionate share of the
property, it also appeared to apply the priority rule formu-
lated in In re Hallett’s Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696 (CA)
without taking account of the variation made to that rule in
In re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch 356. Reflecting the no profit rule,
Oatway established (at 361) that where a trustee mixes his
own funds with trust funds, the order of withdrawals is
wholly immaterial. The funds that are no longer recoverable
must be debited to the trustee, while the trust money must be
debited to any investments that remain. The Family Court
was therefore correct to apply all of K’s share to the expen-
diture on the home, as that was the only investment that
remained, whereas the High Court allowed the abberant
trustee to profit from his breach of trust at the expense of the
beneficiary.
The Family Court declined to make any order in respect of
K’s interest given that it was only empowered to settle the
relationship property dispute ([32], [43]–[46]). The High
Court did not feel so constrained, finding it had jurisdiction
both as an appellate Court exercising the equitable jurisdic-
tion of the Family Court, conferred by the District Courts Act
1947, and under its inherent parens patriae jurisdiction to
protect K’s interests. It gave her an interest in the family home
or its proceeds to be held by an independent trustee ([81]–[85]).
While this order protected K’s funds in the home, she would
have to pursue a personal claim against her father for breach
of trust to recover the remainder of her inheritance. The
relationship property proceedings having been determined,
K would have no opportunity in subsequent trust proceed-
ings to revisit the orders made in the PRA proceedings. The
effect of the High Court order in the PRA proceedings was to
limit K’s beneficial interest in the home, contrary to trust law.
TRUST PROPERTY NOT COMPLETELY OUT OF
BOUNDS
The third point to bear in mind is that while, in general, the
PRA is subservient to trusts, there are nevertheless avenues
available to a spouse or partner who faces the problem of
assets locked away in trust.
First, it may be that despite the removal of relationship
property by one partner to an express trust, the circum-
stances nevertheless give rise to a constructive or resulting
trust against the trustees of the express trust in favour of one
or the other partner. A constructive trust may arise on the
basis of an intention held by the trustee and the partner in
common that the latter would benefit from the former’s
property. It may also arise on the basis of contributions made
to the property by the partner coupled with his or her
reasonable expectations of benefitting from the property. A
resulting trust will arise where a partner has transferred
property to trustees of the express trust, but there is no
express or implied indication of what the partner intended.
The possibility of constructive and resulting trusts arising
in a PRA matter is illustrated by G v R (HC Wellington, Fam
2007-091-892, 23 July 2010; on appeal Rabson v Gallagher
[2011] NZCA 459). During Ms G and Mr R’s de facto
relationship, Mr R purchased a Lotto ticket with relationship
property which won a prize of $1.3m. The prize money was
used to purchase three houses which were held on trust (the
MRFT). The MRFT trust deed named, as primary beneficia-
ries, Mr R and anyone selected by the trustees from the class
of “discretionary beneficiaries” which included “any de facto
spouse” of Mr R and any children of Mr R. The couple had
a daughter A. In respect of each house, the parties received
from the trustees acknowledgements of debt as to 50 per cent
of the purchase price each. At that time, Ms G was appointed
a trustee and primary beneficiary. Later, a second trust (the
GRFT) was established for the benefit of both parties, to
enable the parties to separate property that the parties con-
sidered to be their joint property from the MRFT which also
held business assets. The houses were sold to the GRFT at
their current value at the time of the transfer, meaning the
MRFT benefited from the capital gain. The parties then
separated. Mr R exercised his power to remove Ms G as
trustee of the MRFT and removed himself as beneficiary,
appointing the daughter A as primary beneficiary. The par-
ties’ consequential property dispute covered a range of items
of property but it is the issue of the houses bought with the
Lotto winnings which was most significant and with which
these comments are concerned. On appeal to the High Court,
this issue was analysed under the rubric of constructive and
resulting trusts.
The Court ruled that Ms G’s share of the houses could not
be held on a resulting trust because it was clear that she had
intended to transfer it absolutely in return for a debt back
([85]–[87]). However, a constructive trust was found to arise
on the basis of an arrangement or common intention between
the parties that Ms G would benefit from the MRFT ([91]–[92]).
An earlier article in this Journal analysed the High Court
decision in detail and expressed doubt over the validity of the
constructive trust ruling (Rickett and Palmer, “Trusts juris-
prudence in the High Court” [2010] NZLJ 353). Put briefly
here, the factual basis for a common intention was contrary
to the earlier finding that Ms G had intended a loan transac-
tion with the trustees. It was also weak given that emphasis
was placed only on Ms G’s expectation, and not on the
trustees’ understanding. Further, the remedy indicated by the
Court as appropriate was not consistent with a declaration of
constructive trust. The Court concluded that an order should
be agreed by the parties that would enable Ms G to partici-
pate as a beneficiary in the MRFT trust. Constructive trusts
give rise to a proprietary interest. They do not enable partici-
pation in a discrete express trust. Reliance on established
principles of constructive and resulting trusts in order to give
priority to a spouse or partner where property is subject to an
express trust and beyond the reach of the PRA must be done
with care so that the relevant principles of trust law are not
misconstrued.
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Secondly, it may be that statute authorises a partner to
access or take account of trust assets in some way. Such
authority exists where property has been settled on trust by
one partner with the intention to defeat the interests of the
other which would otherwise arise under the PRA (s 44
PRA); or where there was no such intention but a disposition
nevertheless defeated the claims of one of the parties (s 44C);
or where dissolution of a marriage or civil partnership results
in a change to the parties’ expectations of the trust when they
settled it (s 182 Family Proceedings Act 1980). Much has
already been written on the content and application of these
well-known provisions (see, for example, Peart et al). Nev-
ertheless, there is still misunderstanding as to when and how
they should apply.
In Rabson v Gallagher [2011] NZCA 459, on appeal
from G v R, counsel for Ms G changed tack somewhat and,
instead of relying on constructive or resulting trusts, sought
application of s 44C which provides for compensation where
either party has transferred relationship property into trust
with the effect of defeating the claim or rights of one of the
parties under the Act. The Court of Appeal allowed the s 44C
claim (and subsequently declined to give any indication on
the appropriateness of a constructive trust claim in the event
the PRA claim had not been successful ([83])). However and
with respect, we question whether s 44C was properly applied
by the Court.
The Court analysed the claim as involving six require-
ments. All but one of the requirements was readily met on the
facts. The transfer of the winnings to the MRFT was a
disposition of relationship property to a trust by both of the
parties after the relationship had begun. Further, the transfer
was not subject to s 44 PRA. The acknowledgement of debts
back from MRFT and the subsequent resettlement on the
GRFT suggest that Mr R had no intent to defeat Ms G’s
rights under the PRA.
Fulfilment of the sixth requirement, considered at [59]–[61],
was more problematic. The disposition must have the effect
of defeating the rights of one of the parties under the PRA.
The Court appeared to analyse the requirement only from
Ms G’s perspective — the houses had increased in value but
Ms G had only received a static debt in return whereas, but
for the trust, she would have been able to share in the
increased value. The Court made no mention of the effect of
the disposition on Mr R. This omission overlooks the pur-
pose of s 44C. It is a compensation provision designed to
restore equality between the parties in line with the underly-
ing right of the parties under the PRA to share equally in all
relationship property, Unless the disposition produces an
unequal benefit as between the parties, there can be no
reason to order one party to compensate the other. There
would be jurisdiction to order compensation only if one
party stood to benefit more from the disposition than the
other party.
It was therefore necessary to compare Mr R’s ability to
benefit from the disposition of the relationship property with
that of Ms G. Mr R’s share in the lotto winnings, and thus the
houses, was also transferred to the MRFT and he too had
received in return a debt from the trust. Likewise, when the
houses were transferred from the MRFT to the GRFT, there
was no unequal benefit because both Mr R and Ms G have
equal opportunity to benefit from that Trust. The GRFT
owed a significant debt to the MRFT as a result of the
transfer of the houses and while it was very unlikely that
Ms G would benefit from the MRFT following separation,
given that Mr R held the power to add and remove benefi-
ciaries and make appointments (as noted by the Court at [72]),
there is nothing in the judgment to indicate that the Court
considered whether Mr R would continue to benefit from
that trust. He had removed himself as a beneficiary and
appointed his daughter as the primary beneficiary in his
place. Of course, it is possible that he could reappoint himself
as beneficiary or benefit indirectly through appointments to
his daughter. But neither of these points was mentioned at all.
Any consideration of Mr R’s standing to benefit was con-
spicuously absent. While the Court of Appeal was right that
the disposition defeated Ms G’s rights, it did not address
whether it would defeat her rights more than Mr R’s rights
and that question is crucial to the availability of relief under
s 44C.
While there is much to be said for s 44C being too narrow
to meet the demands of many cases, it is worthwhile noting
that sometimes its availability appears to be overlooked.
SMB v GAC is such an example. As we argued earlier, Ms B’s
claim under s 9A to an equal share of the increase in value of
the C Trust’s interest in the Fidelity superannuation scheme
was misconceived because Mr C had no property right in the
Trust assets. But a claim under s 44C might well have been
open on the facts. As required by that section, the contribu-
tions to the superannuation scheme sourced from Mr C’s
commissions were dispositions of relationship property to a
trust. As Fidelity withheld the contributions from what would
otherwise have been C’s earnings, they would qualify as
dispositions made by C. Each disposition had the effect of
defeating Ms B’s rights more than Mr C’s rights. But for those
dispositions, there would have been no increase in value in
the trust capital and she would have shared in the full value
of the commissions. Furthermore, it was extremely unlikely
that Ms B would derive any benefit from that increase in
value in the future, whereas Mr C was very likely to benefit
from the superannuation scheme in due course through his
status as a beneficiary of the C Trust. Nor did Ms B derive
any benefit from the C Trust during the relationship. There
was therefore jurisdiction to make an order under s 44C.
Moreover, there was sufficient property outside the trust
from which an appropriate award of compensation could
have been made.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between trusts and the PRA is not an easy
one. There is a popular conception that trusts are being used
inappropriately to avoid the consequences of the PRA and
that the PRA ought to be extended to include trust busting
provisions with greater scope than those currently provided
for. This is a question of policy that may be the subject of
comment by the Law Commission when it completes its
review of trusts.
Until then, the priority afforded to trusts by the PRA
needs to be given effect because that is what the Act currently
requires and because to do otherwise is to create confusion
and uncertainty, and to illegitimately undermine beneficia-
ries’ interests. The basics of establishing a PRA claim should
not be lost sight of whenever one or both of the parties is
connected to a trust. The basics are that the PRA’s jurisdic-
tion extends to property beneficially owned, but goes no
further; determining beneficial ownership is a matter of trust
law; and there are some legitimate ways both within trust law
and pursuant to statutory authority to access trust assets but
these must be properly applied. r
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